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Abstract
In this work, we argue for the importance of causal reasoning in cre-
ating fair algorithms for decision making. We give a review of existing
approaches to fairness, describe work in causality necessary for the under-
standing of causal approaches, argue why causality is necessary for any
approach that wishes to be fair, and give a detailed analysis of the many
recent approaches to causality-based fairness.
1 Introduction
The success of machine learning algorithms has created a wave of excitement
about the problems they could be used to solve. Already we have algorithms that
match or outperform humans in non-trivial tasks such as image classification
[18], the game of Go [37], and skin cancer classification [15]. This has spurred
the use of machine learning algorithms in predictive policing [25], in loan lending
[17], and to predict whether released people from jail will re-offend [9]. In these
life-changing settings however, it has quickly become clear that machine learning
algorithms can unwittingly perpetuate or create discriminatory decisions that
are biased against certain individuals (for example, against a particular race,
gender, sexual orientation, or other protected attributes). Specifically, such
biases have already been demonstrated in natural language processing systems
[5] (where algorithms associate men with technical occupations like ‘computer
programmer’ and women with domestic occupations like ‘homemaker’), and in
online advertising [41] (where Google showed advertisements suggesting that a
person had been arrested when that person had a name more often associated
with black individuals).
As machine learning is deployed in an increasingly wide range of human sce-
narios, it is more important than ever to understand what biases are present in a
decision making system, and what constraints we can put in place to guarantee
that a learnt system never exhibits such biases. Research into these problems
is referred to as algorithmic fairness. It is a particularly challenging area of
research for two reasons: many different features are intrinsically linked to pro-
tected classes such as race or gender. For example, in many scenarios, knowledge
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of someone’s address makes it easy to predict their race with relatively high accu-
racy; while their choice of vocabulary might reveal much about their upbringing
or gender. As such it is to easy to accidentally create algorithms that make de-
cisions without knowledge of a persons race or gender, but still exhibit a racial
or gender bias. The second issue is more challenging still, there is fundamental
disagreement in the field as to what algorithmic fairness really means. Should
algorithms be fair if they always make similar decisions for similar individuals?
Should we instead call algorithms that make beneficial decisions for all genders
at roughly the same rate fair? Or should we use a third different criteria? This
question is of fundamental importance as many of these different criteria can
not be satisfied at the same time [22].
In this work we argue that it is important to understand where these sources
of bias come from in order to rectify them, and that causal reasoning is a
powerful tool for doing this. We review existing notions of fairness in prediction
problems; the tools of causal reasoning; and show how these can be combined
together using techniques such as counterfactual fairness [23].
2 Current Work in Algorithmic Fairness
To discuss the existing measures of fairness, we use capital letters to refer to
variables and lower case letters to refer to a value a variable takes. For example,
we will always use A for a protected attribute such as gender, and a or a′ to
refer to the different values the attribute can take such as man or woman. We
use Y to refer to the true state of a variable we wish to predict, for example
the variable might denote whether a person defaults on a loan or if they will
violate parole conditions. We will use Yˆ to denote our prediction of the true
variable Y . The majority of definitions of fairness in prediction problems are
statements about probability of a particular prediction occurring given that
some prior conditions hold. In what follows, we will use P (· | ·) to represent
either conditional probability of events, probability mass functions or density
functions, as required by the context.
2.0.1 Equalised Odds
Two definitions of fairness that have received much attention are equalised odds
and calibration. Both were heavily used in the ProPublica investigation into
Northpointe’s COMPAS score, designed to gauge the propensity of a prisoner
to re-offend upon release [16]. The first measure is equalised odds, which says
that if a person truly has state y, the classifier will predict this at the same rate
regardless of the value of their protected attribute. This can be written as an
equation in the following form:
P (Yˆ = y | A = a, Y = y) = P (Yˆ = y | A = a′, Y = y) (1)
for all y, a, a′. Another way of stating this property is by saying that Yˆ is
independent of A given Y , which we will denote by Yˆ ⊥ A | Y .
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2.0.2 Calibration
The second condition is referred to as calibration (or ‘test fairness’ in [9]). This
reverses the previous condition of equalised odds, and says that if the classifier
predicts that a person has state y, their probability of actually having state y
should be the same for all choices of attribute.
P (Y = y | A = a, Yˆ = y) = P (Y = y | A = a′, Yˆ = y) (2)
for all choices of y, a, and a′, that is, Y ⊥ A | Yˆ .
Although the two measures sound very similar, they are fundamentally in-
compatible. These two measures achieved some notoriety when Propublica
showed that Northpointe’s COMPAS score violated equalised odds, accusing
them of racial discrimination. In response, Northpointe claimed that their
COMPAS score satisfied calibration and that they did not discriminate. Klein-
berg et al. [22] and Chouldechova [8] showed that both conditions cannot be
satisfied at the same time except in special cases such as zero prediction error
or if Y ⊥ A.
The use of calibration and equalised odds has another major limitation. If
Y 6⊥ A, the true scores Y typically have some inherent bias. This happens,
for example, if the police are more likely to unfairly decide that minorities are
violating their parole. The definitions of calibration or equalised odds do not
explicitly forbid the classifier from preserving an existing bias.
2.0.3 Demographic Parity/Disparate Impact
Perhaps the most common non-causal notion of fairness is demographic parity,
defined as follows:
P (Yˆ = y | A = a) = P (Yˆ = y | A = a′), (3)
for all y, a, a′, that is, Yˆ ⊥ A. If unsatisfied, this notion is also referred to as
disparate impact. Demographic parity has been used, for several purposes, in
the following works: [14, 19, 20, 24, 42, 43].
Satisfying demographic parity can often require positive discrimination, where
certain individuals who are otherwise very similar are treated differently due to
having different protected attributes. Such disparate treatment can violate other
intuitive notions of fairness or equality, contradict equalised odds or calibration,
and in some cases is prohibited by law.
2.0.4 Individual Fairness
Dwork et al. [12] proposed the concept of individual fairness as follows.
P (Yˆ (i) = y | X(i), A(i)) ≈ P (Yˆ (j) = y | X(j), A(j)), if d(i, j) ≈ 0, (4)
where i, j refer to two different individuals and the superscripts (i), (j) are their
associated data. The function d(·, ·) is a ‘task-specific’ metric that describes
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how any pair of individuals should be treated similarly in a fair world. The
work suggests that this metric could be defined by ‘a regulatory body, or . . . a
civil rights organization’. While this notion mitigates the issues with individ-
ual predictions that arose from demographic parity, it replaces the problem of
defining fairness with defining a fair metric d(·, ·). As we observed in the in-
troduction, many variables vary along with protected attributes such as race
or gender, making it challenging to find a distance measure that will not allow
some implicit discrimination.
2.0.5 Causal Notions of Fairness
A number of recent works use causal approaches to address fairness [1, 7, 21,
23, 35, 44], which we review in more detail in Section 5. We describe selected
background on causal reasoning in Section 3. These works depart from the pre-
vious approaches in that they are not wholly data-driven but require additional
knowledge of the structure of the world, in the form of a causal model. This
additional knowledge is particularly valuable as it informs us how changes in
variables propagate in a system, be it natural, engineered or social. Explicit
causal assumptions remove ambiguity from methods that just depend upon sta-
tistical correlations. For instance, causal methods provide a recipe to express
assumptions on how to recover from sampling biases in the data (Section 4)
or how to describe mixed scenarios where we may believe that certain forms
of discrimination should be allowed while others should not (e.g., how gender
influences one’s field of study in college, as in Section 5).
3 Causal Models
We now review causality in sufficient detail for our analysis of causal fairness
in Section 5. It is challenging to give a self-contained definition of causality,
as many working definitions reveal circularities on close inspection. For two
random variables X and Y , informally we say that X causes Y when there exist
at least two different interventions on X that result in two different probability
distributions of Y . This does not mean we will be able to define what an
“intervention” is without using causal concepts, hence circularities appear.
Nevertheless, it is possible to formally express causal assumptions and to
compute the consequences of such assumptions if one is willing to treat some
concepts, such as interventions, as primitives. This is just an instance of the tra-
ditional axiomatic framework of mathematical modelling, dating back to Euclid.
In particular, in this paper we will make use primarily of the structural causal
model (SCM) framework advocated by [29], which shares much in common with
the approaches by [33] and [39].
3.1 Structural Causal Models
We define a causal model as a triplet (U, V, F ) of sets such that:
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• V is a set of observed random variables that form the causal system of
our interest;
• U is a set of latent (that is, unobservable) background variables that will
represent all possible causes of V and which jointly follow some distribu-
tion P (U);
• F is a set of functions {f1, . . . , fn}, one for each Vi ∈ V , such that Vi =
fi(pai, Upai), pai ⊆ V \{Vi} and Upai ⊆ U . Such equations are also known
as structural equations [4].
The notation pai is meant to capture the notion that a directed graph G can
be used to represent the input-output relationship encoded in the structural
equations: each vertex X in G corresponds to one random variable in V ∪ U ,
with the same symbol used to represent both the vertex and the random variable;
an edge X → Vi is added to G if X is one of the arguments of Vi=fi(·). Hence,
X is said to be a parent of Vi in G. In what follows, we will assume without
loss of generality that vertices in U have no parents in G. We will also assume
that G is acyclic, meaning that it is not possible to start from a vertex X and
return to it following the direction of the edges.
A SCM is causal in the sense it allows us to predict effects of causes and to
infer counterfactuals, as discussed below.
3.2 Interventions, Counterfactuals and Predictions
The effect of a cause follows from an operational notion of intervention. This
notion says that a perfect intervention on a variable Vi, at value v, corresponds
to overriding fi(·) with the equation Vi = v. Once this is done, the joint
distribution of the remaining variables V\i ≡ V \{Vi} is given by the causal
model. Following [29], we will denote this operation as P (V\i | do(Vi = vi)).
This notion is immediately extendable to a set of simultaneous interventions on
multiple variables.
The introduction of the do(·) operator emphasises the difference between
P (V\i | do(Vi = vi)) and P (V\i | Vi = vi). As an example, consider the following
structural equations:
Z = UZ , (5)
A = λazZ + UA, (6)
Y = λyaA+ λyzZ + UY . (7)
The corresponding graph is shown in Figure 1(a). Assuming that the back-
ground variables follow a standard Gaussian with diagonal covariance matrix,
standard algebraic manipulations allows us to calculate that P (Y = y | A = a)
has a Gaussian density with a mean that depends on λaz, λya and λyz. In con-
trast, E[Y | do(A = a)] = λyaa, which can be obtained by first erasing (6) and
replacing A with a on the right-hand side of (7) followed by marginalizing the
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Figure 1: (a) A causal graph for three observed variables A, Y, Z. (b) A joint
representation with explicit background variables, and two counterfactual alter-
natives where A is intervened at two different levels. (c) Similar to (b), where
the interventions take place on Y .
remaining variables. The difference illustrates the dictum “causation is not cor-
relation”: Z acts as a confounder (common cause) of exposure A and outcome
Y . In a randomised controlled trial (RCT), A is set by design, which breaks
its link with Z. In an observational study, data is generated by the system
above, and standard measures of correlation between A and Y will not provide
the correct interventional distribution: P (Y | do(A = a)). The do(·) operator
captures the notion of effect of a cause, typically reported in terms of a contrast
such as E[Y | do(A = a)]−E[Y | do(A = a′)] for two different intervention levels
a, a′.
Another causal inference task is the computation of counterfactuals implied
from causal assumptions and observations: informally, these are outcomes fol-
lowing from alternative interventions on the same unit. A “unit” is the snapshot
of a system at a specific context, such as a person at a particular instant in time.
Operationally, a unit can be understood as a particular instantiation of the back-
ground variable set U , which determine all variables in V except for those being
intervened upon. Lower-case u will be used to represent such realisations, with
U interpreted as a random unit. The name “counterfactual” comes from the
understanding that, if the corresponding exposure already took place, then any
such alternative outcomes would be (in general) contrary to the realised facts.
Another commonly used term is potential outcomes [34], a terminology reflect-
ing that strictly speaking such outcomes are not truly counterfactual until an
exposure effectively takes place.
For any possible intervention Vj = vj for unit u, we denote the counterfactual
of Vi under this intervention as Vi(vj , u). This notation also accommodates the
simultaneous hypothetical interventions on the corresponding set of background
variables U at level u. The factual realisation of a random variable Vi for unit u is
still denoted by Vi(u). The random counterfactual corresponding to intervention
Vj = vj for an unspecified unit U is denoted as Vi(vj , U) or, equivalently, Vi(vj)
for notational simplicity.
By treating U as a set of random variables, this implies that factuals and
counterfactuals have a joint distribution. One way of understanding it is via
Figure 1(b), which represents a factual world and two parallel worlds where A
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is set to intervention levels a and a′. A joint distribution for Y (a) and Y (a′) is
implied by the model. Conditional distributions, such as P (Y (a) = ya, Y (a
′) =
ya′ | A = a, Y = y, Z = z) are also defined. Figure 1(c) shows the case for
interventions on Y . It is not difficult to show, as Y is not an ancestor of A
in the graph, that A(y, u) = A(y′, u) = A(u) for all u, y, y′. This captures the
notion the Y does not cause A.
3.3 Counterfactuals Require Untestable Assumptions
Unless structural equations depend on observed variables only, they cannot
be tested for correctness (unless other untestable assumptions are imposed).
We can illustrate this problem by noting that a conditional density function
P (Vj | Vi = v) can be written as an equation Vj = f1(v, U) ≡ F−1Vi=v(U) =
F−1Vi=v(g
−1(g(U))) ≡ f2(v, U ′), where F−1Vi=V (·) is the inverse cumulative distri-
bution function corresponding to P (Vj | Vi = v), U is an uniformly distributed
random variable on [0, 1], g(·) is some arbitrary invertible function on [0, 1], and
U ′ ≡ g(U). While this is not fundamental for effects of causes, which depend
solely on predictive distributions that at least in theory can be estimated from
RCTs, different structural equations with the same interventional distributions
will imply different joint distributions over the counterfactuals.
The traditional approach for causal inference in statistics tries to avoid any
estimand that cannot be expressed by the marginal distributions of the counter-
factuals (i.e., all estimands in which marginals P (Y (a) = ya) and P (Y (a
′) = ya′)
would provide enough information, such as the average causal effect E[Y (a) −
Y (a′)] = E[Y | do(A = a)]−E[Y | do(A = a′)]). Models that follow this approach
and specify solely the univariate marginals of a counterfactual joint distribution
are sometimes called single-world models [32]. However, as we will see, cross-
world models seem a natural fit to algorithmic fairness. In particular, they are
required for non-trivial statements that concern fairness at an individual level
as opposed to fairness measures averaged over groups of individuals.
4 Why Causality is Critical For Fairness
Ethicists and social choice theorists recognise the importance of causality in
defining and reasoning about fairness. Terminology varies, but many of their
central questions and ideas, such as the role of agency in justice, responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism, and luck egalitarianism [10, 13, 31] involve causal rea-
soning. Intuitively, it is unfair for individuals to experience different outcomes
caused by factors outside of their control. Empirical studies of attitudes about
distributive justice [6, 26] have found that most participants prefer redistribu-
tion to create fairer outcomes, and do so in ways that depend on how much
control individuals have on their outcomes. Hence, when choosing policies and
designing systems that will impact people, we should minimise or eliminate the
causal dependence on factors outside an individual’s control, such as their per-
ceived race or where they were born. Since such factors have influences on other
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aspects of peoples’ lives that may also be considered relevant for determining
what is fair, applying this intuitive notion of fairness requires careful causal
modelling as we describe here.
Is it necessary that models attempting to remove such factors be causal?
Many other notions of algorithmic fairness have also attempted to control or
adjust for covariates. While it is possible to produce identical predictions or de-
cisions with a model that is equivalent mathematically but without overt causal
assumptions or interpretations, the design decisions underlying a covariate ad-
justment are often based on implicit causal reasoning. There is a fundamental
benefit from an explicit statement of these assumptions. To illustrate this, we
consider a classic example of bias in graduate admissions.
4.1 Revisiting Gender Bias In Berkeley Admissions
The Berkeley admissions example [3] is often used to explain Simpson’s paradox
[38] and highlight the importance of adjusting for covariates. In the fall of 1973,
about 34.6% of women and 44.3% of men who applied to graduate studies at
Berkeley were admitted. However, this was not evidence that the admissions
decisions were biased against women. Decisions were made on a departmental
basis, and each department admitted proportions of men and women at ap-
proximately the same rate. However, a greater proportion of women applied to
the most selective departments, resulting in a lower overall acceptance rate for
women.
While the overall outcome is seemingly unfair, after controlling for choice
of department it appears to be fair, at least in some sense. In fact, while the
presentation of this example to illustrate Simpson’s paradox often ends there,
the authors in [3] conclude, ”Women are shunted by their socialisation and
education toward fields of graduate study that are generally more crowded, less
productive of completed degrees, and less well funded, and that frequently offer
poorer professional employment prospects.” The outcome can still be judged to
be unfair, not due to biased admissions decisions, but rather to the causes of
differences in choice of department, such as socialisation. Achieving or defining
fairness requires addressing those root causes and applying value judgements.
Applicants certainly have some agency over which department they apply to,
but that decision is not made free of outside influences. They had no control
over what kind of society they had been born into, what sort of gender norms
that society had during their lifetime, or the scarcity of professional role models,
and so on.
The quote above suggests that the authors in [3] were reasoning about causes
even if they did not make explicit use of causal modelling. Indeed, conditioning
on the choice of the department only makes sense because we understand it has
a causal relationship with the outcome of interest and is not just a spurious cor-
relation. Pearl [29] provides a detailed account of the causal basis of Simpson’s
paradox.
8
4.2 Selection Bias and Causality
Unfairness can also arise from bias in how data is collected or sampled. For
instance, if the police stop individuals on the street to check for the possession
of illegal drugs, and if the stopping protocol is the result of discrimination
that targets individuals of a particular race, this can create a feedback loop
that justifies discriminatory practice. Namely, if data gathered by the police
suggests that P (Drugs = yes | Race = a) > P (Drugs = yes | Race = a′),
this can be exploited to justify an unbalanced stopping process when police
resources are limited. How then can we assess its fairness? It is possible to
postulate structures analogous to the Berkeley example, where a mechanism
such as Race → Economic status → Drugs explains the pathway. Debate
would focus on the level of agency of an individual on finding himself or herself
at an economic level that leads to increased drug consumption.
But selection bias cuts deeper than that, and more recently causal knowledge
has been formally brought in to understand the role of such biases [2, 40]. This
is achieved by representing a selection variable Selected as part of our model,
and carrying out inference by acknowledging that, in the data, all individuals
are such that “Selected = true”. The association between race and drug is
expressed as P (Drugs = yes | Race = a, Selected = true) > P (Drugs =
yes | Race = a′, Selected = true), which may or may not be representative of
the hypothetical population in which everyone has been examined. The data
cannot directly tell whether P (Drugs = yes | Race = a, do(Selected = true)) >
P (Drugs = yes | Race = a′, do(Selected = true)). As an example, it is possible
to postulate the two following causal structures that cannot be distinguished
on the basis of data already contaminated with selection bias: (i) the structure
Race → Drugs, with Selected being a disconnected vertex; (ii) the structure
Race → Selected ← H → Drugs, where H represents hidden variables not
formally logged in police records.
In the latter case, we can check that drugs and race and unrelated. However,
P (Drugs = yes | Race = a, Selected = true) 6= P (Drugs = yes | Race =
a′, Selected = true), as conditioning on Selected means that both of its causes
Race and H “compete” to explain the selection. This induces an association
between Race and H, which carries over the association between Race and
Drugs. At the same time, P (Drugs = yes | Race = a, do(Selected = true)) =
P (Drugs = yes | Race = a′, do(Selected = true)), a conclusion that cannot
be reached without knowledge of the causal graph or a controlled experiment
making use of interventions. Moreover, if the actual structure is a combination
of (i) and (ii), standard statistical adjustments that remove the association
between Race and Drugs cannot disentangle effects due to selection bias from
those due to the causal link Race → Drugs, harming any arguments that can
be constructed around the agency behind the direct link.
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4.3 Fairness Requires Intervention
Approaches to algorithmic fairness usually involve imposing some kind of con-
straints on the algorithm (such as those formula given by Section 2). We can
view this as an intervention on the predicted outcome Yˆ . And, as argued in
[1], we can also try to understand the causal implications for the system we are
intervening on. That is, we can use an SCM to model the causal relationships
between variables in the data, between those and the predictor Yˆ that we are
intervening on, and between Yˆ and other aspects of the system that will be
impacted by decisions made based on the output of the algorithm.
To say that fairness is an intervention is not a strong statement considering
that any decision can be considered to be an intervention. Collecting data, using
models and algorithms with that data to predict some outcome variable, and
making decisions based on those predictions are all intentional acts motivated
by a causal hypothesis about the consequences of that course of action. In
particular, not imposing fairness can also be a deliberate intervention, albeit
one of inaction.
We should be clear that prediction problems do not tell the whole story.
Breaking the causal links between A and a prediction Yˆ is a way of avoiding
some unfairness in the world, but it is only one aspect of the problem. Ideally,
we would like that no paths from A to Y existed, and the provision of fair
predictions is predicated on the belief that it will be a contributing factor for
the eventual change in the generation of Y . We are not, however, making any
formal claims of modelling how predictive algorithmic fairness will lead to this
ideal stage where causal paths from A to Y themselves disappear.
5 Causal Notions of Fairness
In this section we discuss some of the emerging notions of fairness formulated
in terms of SCMs, focusing in particular on a notion introduced by us in [23],
counterfactual fairness. We explain how counterfactual fairness relates to some
of the more well-known notions of statistical fairness and in which ways a causal
perspective contributes to their interpretation. The remainder of the section will
discuss alternative causal notions of fairness and how they relate to counterfac-
tual fairness.
5.1 Counterfactual Fairness
A predictor Yˆ is said to satisfy counterfactual fairness if
P (Yˆ (a, U) = y | X = x,A = a) = P (Yˆ (a′, U) = y | X = x,A = a), (8)
for all y, x, a, a′ in the domain of the respective variables [23]. The randomness
here is on U (recall that background variables U can be thought of as describing
a particular individual person at some point in time). In practice, this means
we can build Yˆ from any variable Z in the system which is not caused by A
10
(meaning there is no directed path from A to Z in the corresponding graph).
This includes the background variables U which, if explicitly modelled, allows
us to use as much information from the existing observed variables as possible1.
This notion captures the intuition by which, “other things being equal”
(i.e., the background variables), our prediction would not have changed in the
parallel world where only A would have changed. Structural equations provide
an operational meaning for counterfactuals such as “what if the race of the
individual had been different”. This can be interpreted solely as comparing
two hypothetical individuals which are identical in background variables U but
which differ in the way A is set. As described in Section 33.3, in most cases
we will not be able to verify that the proposed structural equations perfectly
describe the unfairness in the data at hand. Instead, they are means to describe
explicit assumptions made about the mechanisms of unfairness, and to expose
these assumptions openly to criticism.
The application of counterfactual fairness requires a causal model M to be
formulated, and training data for the observed variables X, A and the target
outcome Y . Unlike other approaches discussed in the sequel, we purposely avoid
making use of any information concerning the structural equation for Y in model
M2. This is motivated by the fact that Yˆ must not make use of Y at test time.
At training time, the only thing that matters for any prediction algorithm of
interest is to reconstruct Y directly, which can be done via the data. Note that
the data could also be Monte Carlo samples drawn from a theoretical model.
As an example, consider the simple causal model A → X → Y , UX → X,
with the structural equation X = fX(A,UX). Yˆ must not be a function of A
or X except via UX , or otherwise Yˆ (a, uX) 6= Yˆ (a′, uX) will be different since
in general fX(a, uX) 6= fX(a′, uX). For any Yˆ ≡ g(UX), marginalising UX via
P (UX | X = x,A = a) guarantees (8). We can use any statistical method to fit
g(·), e.g., by minimising some loss function with respect to the distribution of
Y directly.
5.2 Counterfactual Fairness and Common Statistical No-
tions
We now relate counterfactual fairness to the non-causal, statistical notions of
fairness introduced in Section 2.
5.2.1 Demographic Parity
Note that if the background variables U are uniquely determined by observed
data {X = a,A = a}, and Yˆ is a function only of background variables U
and observed variables which are independent of A, then a counterfactually
1By conditioning on the event {X = a,A = a} we are essentially extracting information
from the individual to learn these background variables.
2If Y provides information for some parameters of M, we can of course fit M using this
data. Our point here is what happens after M has been decided.
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fair predictor will satisfy eq. (3). In this sense, counterfactual fairness can be
understood to be a counterfactual analogue of demographic parity.
5.2.2 Individual Fairness
If we think of the two different individuals defined in eq. (4) as matched by a
statistical matching procedure [27], then they can be thought of as counterfac-
tual versions of each other. Specifically, in such a procedure the counterfactual
version of individual i that is used to estimate a causal effect is in reality an
observed case j in a sample of controls, such that i and j are close in some
space of pre-treatment variables (that is, variables not descendant of A) [27].
This “closeness” can be directly specified by the distance metric in eq. (4). In-
terpreted this way the individual fairness condition is similar to a particular
instantiation of counterfactual fairness (i.e., via matching). One notable dif-
ference is that in [12] the fairness condition holds for all pairs of individuals,
not just for the closest pairs as in matching. Unlike matching, the predictor is
encouraged to be different for individuals that are not close.
5.2.3 Equalised Odds and Calibration
A sufficient condition for Y ⊥ A is that there are no causal paths between
Y and A (this condition is also necessary under the assumption of faithfulness
discussed by [39]). In this case, it not hard to show graphically that a coun-
terfactually fair Yˆ built by just using non-descendants of A in the graph will
respect both equalised odds (Yˆ ⊥ A | Y ) and calibration (Y ⊥ A | Yˆ ). Like-
wise, if there exists a Yˆ such that Yˆ = Y for all units (zero prediction error),
this can be recovered by a causal model that postulates all the inputs to the
structural equation of Y , and where such inputs can be recovered from the
observed covariates.
We can also argue that if Y 6⊥ A, then neither equalised odds, eq. (1), nor
calibration, eq. (2), may be desirable. For instance, if A is an ancestor of Y , then
we should not try to reproduce Y as it is a variable that carries bias according
our counterfactual definition (using Yˆ = Y ). It becomes unclear why we should
strive to achieve (e.g.) calibration when our target should be “fair” components
that explain the variability of Y (like the non-descendants of A) instead of all
sources of variability that generate Y .
5.3 A Framework to Categorise Causal Reasoning in Fair-
ness
Counterfactual fairness was originally proposed as a particular trade-off link-
ing strength of assumptions and practicalities. In parallel, other notions have
emerged which propose different trade-offs. In what follows, we provide a critical
appraisal of alternatives and a common framework to understand the dimensions
in which causal reasoning plays a role in algorithmic fairness. The dimensions
are:
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• individual vs. group level causal effects. As discussed in Section 3, coun-
terfactual reasoning takes place at the individual level, while distributions
indexed by the do(·) operator are meant to capture the effects of actions
in groups. There is a clear advantage on targeting group effects, since
they do not require postulating an unobservable joint distribution of two
or more outcomes which can never be observed together, where even the
existence of counterfactuals can justifiably be treated as a metaphysical
concept [11]. However, fairness is commonly understood at an individual
level, where unit-level assumptions are required in many scenarios;
• explicit vs. implicit structural equations. Although counterfactual models
require untestable assumptions, not all assumptions are created equal. In
some scenarios, it is possible to obtain some degree of fairness by postulat-
ing independence constraints among counterfactuals without committing
to any particular interpretation of latent variables. This is however not
always possible without losing significant information;
• prediction vs. explanation. Sometimes the task is not to create a new
fair predictor, but to quantify in which ways an existing decision-making
process is discriminatory;
Counterfactual fairness, for instance, is a notion that (i) operates at the
individual level, (ii) has explicit structural equations and, (iii) targets prediction
problems. Besides using this framework to categorise existing notions, we will
provide a discussion on path-specific effects and how they relate to algorithmic
fairness.
5.3.1 Purely Interventional Notions
Due to the ultimately untestable nature of counterfactuals, it is desirable to
avoid several of its assumptions whenever possible. One way to do this is by
defining constraints on the interventional distributions P (Yˆ | do(A = a), X = x)
only. The work by [21] emphasises this aspect, while making explicit particular
notions of path-specific effects which we will discuss in a latter section. The
interventional notion advanced by [21] is the constraint:
P (Yˆ | do(A = a)) = P (Yˆ | do(A = a′)).
A predictor Yˆ is constructed starting from the causal modelM for the system.
A family of models is constructed by modifications toM so that the total effect
of A on Yˆ is cancelled. The family of models itself can be parameterised so that
minimising error with respect to Y is possible within this constrained space.
To understand this via an example, consider a variation of equations (5)-
(7) where now we have four variables, Z,A,X, Yˆ . Variable A is the protected
attribute, X = λxaA + λxzZ + UX and Yˆ = λyˆaA + λyˆzZ + λyˆxX + UY .
Parameters Λ ≡ {λyˆa, λyˆz, λyˆx} are free parameters, while those remaining are
assumed to be part of the given causal model. However, such free parameters
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will be constrained. This can be seen by substituting the equation for X into
that for Yˆ as follows: Yˆ = λyˆaA + λyˆzZ + λyˆx(λxaA + λzxZ + UX) + UY . As
UX and UY are assumed to be independent of A by construction, it is enough
to consider the sub-models where λyˆa + λyˆxλxa = 0 (i.e, the total contribution
of A to Yˆ is 0), optimising Λ to minimise the prediction error of Y under this
constraint.
Although it seems strange that this example and other examples in [21] use
equations, they do not need to be interpreted as structural in order to verify that
P (Yˆ | do(A = a)) = P (Yˆ | do(A = a′)). The equations are just means of param-
eterising the model, with latent variables U being calculation devices rather than
having a real interpretation. If we assume that equations are structural we would
revert back to counterfactual fairness, where the procedure above is just an in-
direct way of regressing on hidden variables UX . However, there are important
issues with the interventional approach as it represents group-level rather than
individual-level causal effects. This means it is perfectly possible that Yˆ is highly
discriminatory in a counterfactual sense and yet satisfies the purely interven-
tional criterion: consider the case where the structural equation Y = f(A,UY )
is such that P (UY = 0) = P (UY = 1) = 1/2 and f(a, 1) = a, f(a, 0) = 1 − a,
for a ∈ {0, 1}. Then P (Y = 1 | do(A = 1)) = P (Y = 1 | do(A = 0)) = 1/2, even
though for every single individual we have that Y (a, uY ) = 1 − Y (1 − a, uY )
(i.e., we get exactly the opposite prediction for a fixed individual uY if their
race a changes). Conditioning on other attributes does not help: the expression
P (Y | do(A = a), X = x)−P (Y | do(A = a′), X = x)) = 0 is not realistic if X is
a descendant of A in the causal graph, since in this case no single individual will
keep X at a fixed level as A hypothetically varies. This is a comparison among
different individuals who are assigned different A and yet happen to coincide
on X. Thus we argue that it is less obvious how to motivate this notion of
conditioning. This is not an issue if X is not a descendant of A, but then again,
in this case, we do not need to know the structural equation for X in order to
use it according to counterfactual fairness.
5.3.2 Counterfactuals without Explicit Structural Equations
When the goal is to minimise the number of untestable assumptions, one direc-
tion is to avoid making any explicit assumptions about the structural equations
of the causal model. In this line of work, assumptions about the directed edges
in the causal graph and a parametric formulation for the observed distribu-
tions are allowed, as well as independence constraints among counterfactuals.
However, no explicit structural equations are allowed.
The work by [28] presents such ideas by making a direct connection to the
long tradition in graphical causal models of providing algorithms for identifying
causal estimands. That is, without assuming any particular parametric contri-
bution from latent variables, such approaches either provide a function of P (V )
(recall that V is the set of all observed variables) that is equal to a causal effect
of interest, or report whether such a transformation is not at all possible (that
is, the causal effect of interest is unidentifiable from P (V ) and a causal graph)
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[29]. The main idea of [28] is to first identify which causal effects of protected
attribute A on outcome Y should be (close to) zero (i.e., those we wish to
make fair). For instance, similar to counterfactual fairness, we may require that
E[Y (a)] = E[Y (a′)]. In some models, we can express E[Y (a)] − E[Y (a′)] = 0 as
a constraint on P (V ). The model can then be fit subject to such a constraint.
Predictor Yˆ is what the constrained model predicts as Y .
Despite its desirable features, there are major prices to be paid by avoiding
structural equations. For technical reasons, enforcing such constraints require
throwing away information from any descendant of A that is judged to be on an
“unfair path” from A to Y . Further, in many cases, the causal effect of interest
is not identifiable. Even if it is, the constrained fitting procedure can be both
computationally challenging and not necessarily have a clear relationship to
the actual loss function of interest in predicting Y . This is because it first
requires assuming a model for Y and fitting a projection of the model to the
space of constrained distributions. And while explicit claims about structural
equations are avoided, the approach still relies on cross-world assumptions of
independences among counterfactuals.
A different take with a similar motivation was recently introduced by [44]. It
focuses on decomposing counterfactual measures of causal effects across different
paths to explain discrimination. For example, the association between A and
Y can be decomposed by the causal effect of A on Y that is due to directed
paths from A to Y and due to a common cause of A and Y . Although no
particular way of building a fair predictor Yˆ is provided, [44] explicitly discuss
how modifications to particular parts of the causal model can lead to changes in
the counterfactual measures of discrimination, an important and complementary
goal of the problem of fair predictions. This work also illustrates alternative
interpretations of causal unfairness: in our work, we would not consider Yˆ to
be unfair if the causal graph is A ← X → Yˆ , as A is not a cause of Yˆ , while
[44] would label it as a type of “spurious” discrimination. Our take is that if
Yˆ is deemed unfair, it must be so by considering X as yet another protected
attribute.
Regarding the challenges posed by causal modelling, we advocate that as-
sumptions about structural equations are still useful if interpreted as claims
about how latent variables with a clear domain-specific meaning contribute to
the pathways of interest. Even if imperfect, this direction is a way of increasing
transparency about the motivation for labelling particular variables and paths
as “unfair”. It still offers a chance of falsification and improvement when then-
latent variables are measured in subsequent studies. If there are substantive
disagreements about the functional form of structural equations, multiple mod-
els can be integrated in the same predictive framework as introduced by [35].
5.3.3 Path-specific Variations
A common theme of the alternatives to counterfactual fairness [21, 28, 44] is the
focus on path-specific effects, which was only briefly mentioned in our formula-
tion. One example for understanding path-specificity and its relation to fairness
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is the previously discussed case study of gender bias in the admissions to the
University of California at Berkeley in the 1970s: gender (A) and admission (Y )
were found to be associated in the data, which lead to questions about fairness
of the admission process. One explanation found was that this was due to the
choice of department each individual was applying to (X). By postulating the
causal structure A→ X → Y , we could claim that, even though A is a cause of
Y , the mechanism by which it changes Y is “fair” in the sense that we assume
free-will in the choice of department made by each applicant. This is of course
a judgement call that leaves unexplained why there is an interaction between
A and other causes of X, but one that many analysts would agree with. The
problem gets more complicated if edge A→ Y is also present.
The approach by [28] can tap directly from existing methods for deriving
path-specific effects as functions of P (V ) (see [36] for a review). The method by
[21] and the recent variation of counterfactual fairness by [7] consist of adding
“corrections” to a causal model to deactivate particular causal contributions to
Y . This is done by defining a particular fairness difference we want to min-
imise, typically the expected difference of the outcomes Y under different levels
of A. [7] suggest doing this without parameterising a family of Yˆ to be opti-
mised. At its most basic formulation, if we define PSE(V ) as the particular
path-specific effect from A to Y for a particular set of observed variables V ,
by taking expectations under Y we have that a fair Yˆ can be simply defined as
E[Y | V \{Y }]−PSE(V ). Like in [28], it is however not obvious which optimally
is being achieved for the prediction of Y as it is unclear how such a transfor-
mation would translate in terms of projecting Y into a constrained space when
using a particular loss function.
Our own suggestion for path-specific counterfactual fairness builds directly
on the original: just extract latent fair variables from observed variables that
are known to be (path-specifically) fair and build a black-box predictor around
them. For interpretation, it is easier to include Yˆ in the causal graph (removing
Y , which plays no role as an input to Yˆ ), adding edges from all other vertices
into Yˆ . Figure 2(a) shows an example with three variables A,X1, X2 and the
predictor Yˆ . Assume that, similar to the Berkeley case, we forbid path A →
X1 → Yˆ as an unfair contribution to Yˆ , while allowing contributions via X2
(that is, paths A → X2 → Yˆ and A → X2 → X1 → Yˆ . This generalises the
Berkeley example, where X2 would correspond to department choice and X1 to,
say, some source of funding that for some reason is also affected by the gender
of the applicant). Moreover, we also want to exclude the direct contribution
A→ Yˆ . Assuming that a unit would be set to a factual baseline value a for A,
the “unfair propagation” of a counterfactual value a′ of A could be understood
as passing it only through A → X1 → Yˆ and A → Yˆ in Figure 2(b), leaving
the inputs “through the other edges” at the baseline [30, 36]. The relevant
counterfactual for Yˆ is the nested counterfactual Yˆ (a′, X1(a′, X2(a)), X2(a)).
A direct extension of the definition of counterfactual fairness applies to this
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(a)
Yˆ
A
X1
X2
Yˆ
A
X1
X2
(b)
a
X2(a)
X2(a)
Figure 2: (a) A causal graph linking protected attribute A to predictor Yˆ , where
only a subset of edges will “carry” counterfactual values of A in order to repre-
sent the constraints of path-specific counterfactual fairness. (b) This diagram,
inspired by [30], is a representation of how counterfactuals are propagated only
through some edges. For other edges, inputs are based on the baseline value a
of an individual.
path-specific scenario: we require
P (Yˆ (a′, X1(a′, X2(a)), X2(a)) | X1 = x1, X2 = x2, A = a) =
P (Yˆ (a,X1(a,X2(a)), X2(a)) | X1 = x1, X2 = x2, A = a). (9)
To enforce the constraint in (9), the input to Yˆ can be made to depend
only on the factuals which will not violate the above. For instance, Yˆ ≡ X1
will violate the above, as Yˆ (a,X1(a,X2(a)), X2(a)) = X1(a,X2(a)) = x1 while
Yˆ (a′, X1(a,X2(a′)), X2(a′)) = X1(a′, X2(a)) 6= x1 (in general). Yˆ ≡ X2 is ac-
ceptable, as Yˆ (a,X1(a,X2(a)), X2(a)) = Yˆ (a
′, X1(a′, X2(a)), X2(a)) = X2(a) =
x2.
We need a definition of Yˆ that is invariant as in (9) to any counterfactual
world we choose. Assume that, in our example, A ∈ {a1, . . . , aK} and the struc-
tural equation for X1 is X1 = fX1(A,X2, UX1) for some background variable
UX1 . We can simply set
Yˆ ≡ g(fX1(a1, X2, UX1), . . . , fX1(aK , X2, UX1), X2, UX1)
for some arbitrary function g(·). The only descendant of A in this case is X2,
which we know we can use. Overall, this provides more predictive information
than what would be allowed by using UX1 and UX2 only. One important point:
we know that fX1(a, x2, UX1) = x1 when conditioning on A = a and X2 = x2,
which means that Yˆ is a function of X1. This seems to contradict (9). In fact
it does not, because g(·) is defined without a priori knowledge of which values
of A will be factual for which units.
For instance, if K = 2 and Yˆ ≡ α1fX1(a1, X2, UX1) + α2fX1(a2, X2, UX1) +
β2X2 + β1UX1 , then for a unit with (A = a1, X2 = x2, UX1 = uX1 , X1 = x1 =
fX1(a1, x2, uX1)) we have
Yˆ = α1x1 + α2fX1(a2, x2, UX1) + β2x2 + β1uX1 .
For a unit with (A = a2, X2 = x2, UX1 = uX1 , X1 = x
′
1 = fX1(a2, x2, uX1)),
Yˆ = α1fX1(a1, x2, UX1) + α2x
′
1 + β2x2 + β1uX1 .
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That is, the interaction between the factual value of X1 and particular param-
eters of the predictor will depend on the value of the factual exposure A, not
only on the functional form of g(·), even if the other inputs to Yˆ remain the
same. This is a more general setup than [7] which focuses on particular effects,
such as expected values, and this is a direct extension of our original definition
of counterfactual fairness.
6 Conclusion
Counterfactual fairness is a formal definition of fairness based on causal rea-
soning directly, but any mathematical formalisation of fairness can be studied
within a causal framework as we have described. This approach provides tools
for making the assumptions that underlie intuitive notions of fairness explicit.
This is important, since notions of fairness that are discordant with the actual
causal relationships in the data can lead to misleading and undesirable out-
comes. Only by understanding and accurately modelling the mechanisms that
propagate unfairness through society can we make informed decisions as to what
should be done.
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